The Future of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent - the Minority Report

7.00.00pm GMT Sun 28th Jan 2007

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Below I have reproduced the Minority Report for the Working Group, I have also placed it in the download area where if nothing else it is presented better! It is a long document but well worth reading.

The Future of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent

Background Paper

Minority Report

Contents

1. Introduction

2. The UK's Current Nuclear Deterrent System

3. The International Security Context 3

3.1 The Nuclear Club of 2050

3.2 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

3.3 The Symptoms of Insecurity

4. The Future of Trident: considerations and implications

4.1 Status

4.2 Insecurity and Threats

4.3 Terrorism

4.4 Cost

4.5 Independence

4.6 Nuclear Doctrine

4.7 The Nuclear Taboo and Legality

4.8 The Ethical and Environmental Arguments

5. Conclusions

1. Introduction

1.0.1 Working towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons is a central principle of Liberal Democrat defence policy. In the 2005 general election manifesto we committed to pressing for a new round of multilateral arms reduction talks and retaining the UK's current minimum nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future, until sufficient progress has been made towards the global elimination of such weapons.

1.0.2 Given that the Trident nuclear weapons system has a limited lifespan, and there is a lengthy procurement process for any potential replacement, the UK Government has claimed that a decision on replacement is required in the near future. But, as the House of Commons Defence Select Committee has concluded, no decision on Trident needs to be made before 2010, and no binding decision before 2014. The government must urgently explain the rush to replacement. It would be wholly unacceptable for personal or party political considerations to be driving the timetable for a decision of such importance. It would also be unacceptable for the timing of the decision to be based on an industrial company's need for orders.

1.0.3 Tony Blair's decision to issue a White Paper in December and to hold a parliamentary debate within three months has demonstrated his government's contempt for consultation on this issue. The government has done nothing to facilitate a national debate and consultation, for which there has been precious little time. It looks increasingly like the decision has come first with the justification then being developed in support. It also remains unclear whether a Parliamentary vote will be taken on the substantive question of whether or not Britain should replace Trident.

1.0.4 The Liberal Democrats fear that, for the sake of political expediency, the Government is rushing into a decision which should be considered over a much longer timescale. We believe that any decision must be based on full consideration of the international political and strategic context, threat assessment, cost assessments, proliferation implications and alternative options. It must address the future role and relevance of nuclear deterrence in the light of future threats, its geopolitical impact and the consequences for international peace and security.

1.0.5 Whilst questioning the timeframe on Trident replacement, in light of the Government's determination to reach a decision on the replacement of the Trident system in the coming months, the Federal Policy Committee commissioned a small group to make proposals for Liberal Democrat policy on the future of the Trident system. This Group produced a paper in Summer 2006 that examined the role and effectiveness of the current Trident system and the continuing need for such a system in light of the changed security environment. It also considered the ethical and global context of any decision on the future of Trident.

1.0.6 The second report of the working group discusses the future international security context together with the considerations involved for the UK if a decision were made not to replace Trident. A minority of the group has prepared this alternative report.

2. The UK's Current Nuclear Deterrent System

2.0.1 The UK nuclear weapon capability is provided by a force of four nuclear-powered

Vanguard class submarines each with the capability to carry 16 Trident D5 ballistic missiles. Since 1998, each UK missile was limited to a maximum of 3 independently targetable nuclear warheads. Since the mid-1990s, Trident has also provided a 'sub-strategic' capability. Although details of this concept have not been disclosed, it is widely believed that some missiles may only carry one live warhead, perhaps with an explosive yield well below that of a normal warhead. Since 1998, the total number of warheads is less than 200 of which a maximum of 48 are deployed on one submarine. There is always one submarine on patrol, but its readiness to fire has been greatly reduced in recent years from fifteen minutes notice. Normal 'notice to fire' is now said to be measured in days.

2.0.2 The Trident system first became operational in 1994, and all four boats were available by 2000. It was originally designed to last for 30 years. The missiles are provided by the United States as is the fire control system controlling their launch and the targeting software. The Commons Defence Select Committee reported that the Trident warhead is a W76, which is designed by Los Alamos National Laboratory in the US. The warhead is manufactured and maintained by the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE).

2.0.3 The UK has no other nuclear weapons, although some 110 US nuclear weapons are stored at RAF Lakenheath as part of NATO's nuclear capability. In spite of the end of the cold war, the US stores nearly 500 nuclear weapons at bases in five NATO countries in Europe and Turkey. The purpose of these weapons is unclear.

3. The International Security Context

3.1 The Nuclear Club of 2050

3.1.1 In looking at the future beyond the current planned life for the Trident system, we have to consider the security challenges over the next 20 to 45 years. Assured forecasts of the security environment out to 2050 are impossible. We can only make some assertions about broad trends We can be fairly certain that climate change will be having serious consequences, and that may lead to more conflict, as increasing populations have to manage with shrinking fertile territory. Energy security is likely to be a larger concern and there may be a greater reliance on nuclear power in some states, but it should be emphasised that there is very little connection between civil nuclear technology and nuclear weapon technology. More nations may invest in satellite launch capabilities, which could be used for long range missiles. Populations will have increased with India the largest followed by China, but Europe perhaps declining. This makes it possible that there will be a multipolar power structure involving potential conflict over resources, ideology, energy and/or territory. Alternatively, following the success over the last 25 years of advancing liberal democracy in many regions of the world especially Europe, Latin America and much of Asia, together with the advance of globalisation, most countries will continue to operate peacefully in a rule-based world where a peaceful resolution of conflict will be the norm. We need to work for the latter outcome, making sensible provision for the former.

3.1.2 One security issue is whether there is a risk that states, which might pose the threat of nuclear attack on the UK, could re-emerge in this timescale. That risk depends on the future of the international non-proliferation regime which is discussed in the next section. 60 years ago only the United States possessed nuclear weapons capable of being used in warfare. 40 years ago the four other permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, UK and USSR) had developed usable nuclear weapons and the P5 were recognised as nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was agreed and signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970. The NPT recognised the right of all countries to utilise nuclear energy for civil purposes and hence there was a large increase in states possessing such facilities between 1970 and 1990: whereas in 1970 about 80 power reactors were in operation in 11 states, by 1990 there were over 350 power reactors in over 20 states. Hence in the period 1970-1990 the number of power reactors quadrupled and the number of states with such programmes doubled. Yet the number of states possessing usable nuclear weapons only increased by one in that period: South Africa had developed weapons by 1990 even though it did not have a civil nuclear power programme. Israel had developed nuclear weapons by 1970 and Iraq attempted to develop weapons during the 1980s until the first Gulf War halted its progress; again in neither case was there a nuclear power programme.

3.1.3 Since 1990 India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and have joined the P5 and Israel as nuclear-weapon-capable states. The small number of states which have become nuclear-weapon-capable since the NPT came into force in spite of the large number which possess civil nuclear facilities shows that the global non-proliferation regime, centred on the NPT held fast during the rapid expansion of nuclear power after 1970.

3.1.4 Unfortunately events since 2000 have weakened the non-proliferation regime and put the future of the NPT in doubt. We discuss this in the next section. If the non-proliferation regime were to weaken or fail, the risk of states posing a nuclear threat to the UK in 2050 is increased; on the other hand if the UK were to act to strengthen the NPT that risk is substantially reduced.

3.2 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

3.2.1 As already noted, the cornerstone of the international legal regime on nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which has near universal membership. It represents a bargain between non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) and the recognised nuclear weapon states (NWS) whereby the NNWS are encouraged to pursue civil nuclear energy projects provided that those projects are carried out under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted for use in weapons. For their part the NWS agree to cooperate with the NNWS without discrimination in these projects. Under Article II, the NNWS agree not to develop nuclear weapons while under Article I the NWS agree "not to transfer nuclear weapons or control of nuclear weapons to any recipient whatsoever" either directly or indirectly. Under Article VI the NWS and the NNWS jointly undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.'

3.2.2 Progress on disarmament objectives was made at the NPT Review Conference in 2000 w here the NWS gave an 'unequivocal undertaking … to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals'. A work plan was also agreed for unilateral and multilateral reductions in the size and operational status of strategic and tactical nuclear stockpiles. In 2002, under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between the US and Russia, substantial long-term nuclear arms reductions were agreed. Since then, however, the NPT has come under strain. The Wall Street Journal noted at the 2005 NPT Review Conference that "North Korea is in open defiance of the treaty, Iran is testing its limits, and a Pakistan-based black market has shown how easy it is to end-run the system. Suspicion of the Bush administration also is high, fueled by its interest in developing new nuclear weapons and its rejection of, among others, Comprehensive Test Ban and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaties".

3.2.3 North Korea has now withdrawn from the NPT and has attempted to explode a nuclear weapon (without much success) while Iran is defying UN Security Council Resolution 1696 calling for it to suspend its programme of uranium enrichment: there are ongoing negotiations involving both countries but little optimism of success. For its part, the Bush administration has refused to consider itself bound by the undertaking given by the Clinton administration at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to work towards the elimination of its nuclear arsenal. It continues to request funds from Congress for the development of new nuclear weapons, while Robert Joseph, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, the principal State officer for non- and counter-proliferation matters, is on record saying that his "starting point and first conclusion" in formulating national security strategy is the fact that "nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are a permanent feature of the international environment." while his second conclusion was that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons" have substantial utility."

3.2.4 It is therefore not surprising that recent developments have brought into question the adequacy of the regime governing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As already noted, the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has still not entered into force; the US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), and there was a failure at the NPT 2005 Review Conference to agree on measures to increase the effectiveness of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In addition negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to end the production of highly enriched uranium have stalled. Nuclear weapons continue to play important roles in the defence postures of each possessor and there is no sign that any are seriously considering negotiations that could lead to the elimination of these weapons. Israel, Pakistan and India remain outside the NPT and the US-India agreement on nuclear cooperation threatens to further undermine the NPT.

3.2.5 The multilateral, treaty-based approach has in the past been the most effective means of tackling proliferation: the NPT itself was remarkably effective in its first thirty years. As Greenpeace point out, global cooperation has led to the decommissioning of over half the world's nuclear arsenals. The challenge is to attempt to address the acknowledged weaknesses of the multilateral non-proliferation regime without abandoning the principles upon which it is founded and to which we subscribe: to update and strengthen it and to make it relevant to new and emerging security threats. Strong political will is required to implement robust measures of verification and to enforce compliance on non-weapon states party to the NPT while ensuring that weapon state parties to the NPT fulfil their commitments. The NNWS, backed by the Director-General of the IAEA Dr El Baradei, consider that the NWS are not living up to their NPT obligations. He has said that "we must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security -- and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use."

3.2.6 This call to the nuclear weapon states to fulfil their nuclear disarmament obligations has been strengthened by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's speech at Princeton University just before he left office. In it he said that "All of the NPT nuclear-weapon States are modernising their nuclear arsenals or their delivery systems. They should not imagine that this will be accepted as compatible with the NPT. Everyone will see it for what it is: a euphemism for nuclear re-armament." He continued: "Instead, by clinging to and modernising their own arsenals, even when there is no obvious threat to their national security that nuclear weapons could deter, nuclear-weapon States encourage others - particularly those that do face real threats in their own region - to regard nuclear weapons as essential, both to their security and to their status. It would be much easier to confront proliferators, if the very existence of nuclear weapons were universally acknowledged as dangerous and ultimately illegitimate." He then urged the NWS "to make a joint declaration of intent to achieve the progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons, under strict and effective international control."

3.3 The symptom of insecurity

3.3.1 Progress towards non-proliferation objectives will never be sustainable unless action is taken to address the root-causes of proliferation. Insecurity and international isolation are major factors in states' aspirations for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The initiation of steps to develop or acquire such weapons often leads to further international isolation and insecurity, which then reinforces the perceived need for such weapons.

3.3.2 Regional status and international recognition are also motivators for states acquiring nuclear weapons, as is the determination to deter intervention by foreign states or coalitions of states. For this reason progress on proliferation concerns can be made by reducing isolation, promoting dialogue and confidence building measures, and where necessary, offering economic incentives or security guarantees. To maintain the commitment and support of the non- nuclear weapon states, nuclear weapon states must at the same time continue their agreed path to nuclear disarmament.

3.3.3 Britain cannot afford simply to remain idle in the hope that the inherent pressures within the nuclear non-proliferation regime do not cause a major breakdown in weapons control. We must abide by our own arms control obligations, promote a reinvigoration of nonproliferation initiatives and address the root causes of insecurity. We must seek to chart a course together with states outside the NPT towards a world in which nuclear weapons are marginalised to a point where they no longer play any, or at least any significant, part in international affairs. In the last 50 years, South Africa has acquired nuclear weapons and renounced them as have Ukraine and Kazakhstan, while Australia, Sweden and Canada decided not to proceed with the nuclear weapon programme that they once had. Britain must consider the costs and benefits of making a similar decision.

4. The future of Trident: considerations and implications

4.1 Status

4.1.1 Historically, a motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons has been the effect on national status and prestige. In Britain, which had been an equal partner in the Manhattan Project but excluded by the US at the end of the war, there was an assumption that atomic weapons were needed not only to counter the Soviet threat, but also to retain its place as a leading world power. Similarly France saw the need for a nuclear capability to underpin its return to the world stage as a leading player. Given that each of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the P5) are also the first five nuclear weapon states, some have argued there is an association between nuclear capability and international influence. Such considerations may have been part of the motivation for India's weapons programme.

4.1.2 Britain's claim to world power status once rested on its empire and its role in world finance and trade. With decolonisation in the 1950s, and the failed intervention in the Suez Canal Zone, which exposed Britain's military and financial weaknesses, nuclear weapons came to symbolise the country's claimed status. However, as Sir Michael Quinlan has argued, considerations of national influence merit little weight in the debate on renewal. There is no evidence that Britain would lose its permanent place on the Security Council or its international influence.

4.1.3 Successive British governments, and the British public, have rightly been proud of Britain's record on defence, and of its willingness to play a leading role in the Atlantic Alliance in resisting the Soviet threat during the cold war. It is, however, 15 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; the calculus of alliance solidarity has altered radically. Britain's international role is expressed through the EU, through NATO, through the G8, and through the UN. The strength of Britain's position in these multilateral institutions is measured in terms of diplomatic skills, conventional military commitments and financial contributions.

4.1.4 Britain's status in relation to the United States is nevertheless affected by the nuclear deterrent. Since 1958 Britain has shared nuclear weapon information with the US and since 1962 it also has access to US missiles for its 'independent' deterrent force. Targeting, and intelligence about targeting, have also been dependent on the US. American withdrawal of cooperation would deprive Britain of its nuclear capability since its missiles are stored and maintained in Georgia, USA. Cultivation of a 'special relationship' with the United States may have advantages for Britain. But awareness of dependence on American cooperation for what has been perceived to be a crucial aspect of Britain's defence posture has inhibited successive governments from criticising US policy, and led on occasion to undue willingness to follow American policy to the detriment of our relations with the rest of Europe, the Middle East and developing countries. The decision to replace or not to replace a national deterrent force is therefore also about Britain's perception of its place in the world.

4.2 Insecurity and Threats

4.2.1 The most common strategic reason for developing a nuclear weapons capability is insecurity. A state may believe that a nuclear capability is its only defence against extreme threats. The first Anglo-American nuclear weapon programme was developed in response to the potential development of atomic weapons by Germany in World War II. In the post-war period US and NATO nuclear policy was to use nuclear weapons against the overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. The Soviet Union developed its nuclear capability as part of its armoury against a hostile West which had encircled it. After the Soviet Union had developed a nuclear capability, the UK considered it needed to have a deterrent independent of that of the US since in the last resort, it could not depend on the US to risk its own cities in the defence of British cities. China saw itself as vulnerable to a surprise attack from both the US and the USSR, and it developed a nuclear capability to deter such an attack. Israel sees itself as surrounded by enemies; security concerns drove the Indian and Pakistan nuclear weapons programmes. International isolation can also increase a state's sense of insecurity, and therefore its perceived need for a nuclear capability. This was the case for South Africa during apartheid, and has been true of North Korea, Iran, and Libya at various times.

4.2.2 Today the Soviet Union has disappeared and there is no clear reason for the British nuclear force. Other similar European countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden seem to manage without nuclear weapons. But it is difficult for a country to come to terms with changed circumstances. A future different from the past always alarms. So the government argues that its continued need for nuclear weapons is not based on any particular threat but as an insurance policy against a threat, albeit one that is unknown. It is also argued that the UK possession of nuclear weapons makes the use of nuclear weapons against the UK less likely: this is however debatable: the presence of nuclear weapons inside the country may increase the risk of a preemptive attack by a hostile state or the risk of terrorist attack. The risk of a hostile state with nuclear weapons emerging in the future itself depends on the collapse of the nuclear proliferation regime. While states have confidence in that regime, they will be unlikely to develop nuclear weapons.

4.2.3 The 1998 Strategic Defence Review observed, "There is today no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe." None of the world's current nuclear weapon states pose a present or impending threat to the UK. As Trident is due to be de-commissioned in 2020-2026, we must seek to anticipate the threats that will be facing the UK at that time and beyond.

4.2.4 Consideration must also be given to the future geopolitical context, including analysis of the impact of the rise of China and India and the international potential for political upheaval and conventional conflict. Anticipation is required of developments which could lead to instability or conflict, such as rivalry for resources, particularly oil and gas, given massive western dependency on the unstable Persian Gulf; climate change which has the potential to cause the mass displacement of peoples and severe natural disasters; globalisation and social and economic marginalisation; failed or oppressive states, and pandemics, such as AIDS. A strengthening of international cooperation in alliance with our allies and partners seems to be the best and most cost-effective way of dealing with an uncertain future.

4.3 Terrorism

4.3.1 While nuclear deterrence is feasible between two nuclear weapon states, it is difficult to formulate the logical basis for deterrence where one or more of the parties is a non-state actor. France is the first nuclear power to attempt to set out a doctrine of deterrence against a terror threat. President Chirac, speaking at L'Ile Longue on 19th January 2006 described the new French approach, which was somewhat obscure. On the one hand he said that France's nuclear weapons might be used against a state which used terrorist means to attack France, but on the other he said that nuclear deterrence was not aimed at dissuading fanatical terrorists. US doctrine appears to assume that in certain circumstances rogue states can be held responsible for the action of terror organisations. This assumption is made explicit in the UK government White Paper.

4.3.2 Given the nature and objectives of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, it is very unlikely that nuclear weapons could deter or dissuade terrorists themselves from using weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it is possible to construct realistic scenarios in which a nuclear-armed terrorist movement would welcome a counter attack on its host state. A disproportionate response, even against a general population, may serve terrorist causes, given that it may lead to escalation and engender greater support for the movement.

4.4 Cost

4.4.1 The original Trident acquisition cost was £12,520m (1998 prices), which is £14,893m in today's terms. In the SDR the government estimated annual expenditure for capital and running costs of Trident at 3-4% of the annual defence budget; this is the equivalent of £0.8bn -£1.1bn and therefore amounts to £30bn over Trident's approximate 30 year life span. However, in July 2006 the Defence Secretary stated that the annual expenditure for capital and running costs would increase to 5-5.5% of the annual defence budget, the equivalent of £1.95bn -£2.14bn, a total of £61,350M over Trident's 30-year life span. In the White Paper the government estimates the procurement costs of four new submarines and "associated equipment and infrastructure", as £15-20bn at 2006-07 prices, falling principally between 2012 and 2027. This figure comprises £11-14bn for four submarines, £2-3bn for "the possible future refurbishment or replacement of the warhead", and £2-3bn for "infrastructure over the life of the submarines". This is admitted to be an inaccurate initial estimate (see para 5-11 of the White Paper) and excludes the "in-service costs" of the deterrent which "will remain broadly similar to the current position".

4.4.2 The opportunity costs of investing significant resources in retaining a nuclear deterrent, to insure against future uncertainties, would fall primarily on other elements of Britain's defence budget. The government White Paper repeatedly states that the investment required to maintain a nuclear deterrent will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities our armed forces need, but is less than candid as to what it considers those necessary capabilities to be. This statement of intent is not credible. The UK's conventional forces are under severe financial pressure, and this will remain the case into the future. In the timescale for Trident replacement, there are other large equipment procurements. The two aircraft carriers and their aircraft will have their maximum spend between 2010 and 2020. The army programme for the new family of combat vehicles known as the Future Rapid Effects System, and the RAF Joint Strike Fighter programme are also within this period. It is not clear what, if any, provision has been made in the defence programme for Trident replacement.

4.4.3 If Trident were to be taken out of service early, there would be unplanned (and unquantified) decommissioning costs to be set against the defence programme, but the submarines would need to be decommissioned at some stage in any event so any early cost needs to be balanced against savings at a later date. But the date of retirement of Trident is a secondary question; our argument is about whether Trident needs to be replaced.

4.5 Independence

4.5.1 The UK Trident system is dependent on US technical and operation support: the

Trident II D5 missiles are drawn from a pool shared with the US, and the warheads and submarines both benefit from US assistance. Trident is operationally independent from the US in terms of use, but it is hard to conceive of any use against US wishes that would not jeopardise the long-term future of the system. Political as well as operational factors would be significant. Clearly, any decision to replace Trident would necessitate continuation of this level of dependence on the US.

4.5.2 The costs of developing a new system, without US involvement, would in all likelihood be prohibitively high. The degree of US cooperation and availability of US nuclear weapons technology is clearly an important factor to be considered in the assessment of replacement options. So is the political cost to the UK of continuing dependence on the US. The veteran NATO strategist and former naval officer Michael McGwire wrote earlier this year: "In sum, the benefits to Britain of its nuclear weapons are at best meagre and mainly hypothetical. What then of the costs? The financial burden is not really significant (about 5% of the defence vote). However, the need for technological support is largely responsible for the country's political dependence on America".

4.6 Nuclear doctrine

4.6.1 As long as the UK possesses nuclear weapons, its nuclear weapons doctrine has a significant impact on international stability. Current doctrine refers to use only as a last resort in the supreme national interest within international law. However, the 2002 SDR New Chapter opened up the possibility that the UK would consider the pre-emptive (or perhaps even preventive) use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state, in order to forestall a significant threat being delivered against the UK or its forces. This was confirmed by the then Defence Minister Geoff Hoon in 2003 with respect to UK operations in Iraq. This is unacceptable. The scope of potential use of nuclear force by the UK in relation to non-nuclear weapon states inevitably weakens the argument that other states should not enjoy the same advantages. The emergence of a military doctrine of preventive war, which has no basis in international law, underlines the importance of this concern.

4.6.2 In the new international security environment the UK's present nuclear doctrine requires reappraisal to ensure that it remains credible; is wholly consistent with this country's legal and political obligations; and is compatible with long-term international security. In particular, the UK's negative security assurance that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states must be made clear again. It is vital to ensure that the doctrine buttresses non-proliferation objectives, rather than works against them.

4.7 The nuclear taboo and legality

4.7.1 Nuclear weapons remain unused in warfare since their use against Hiroshima and Nagasaki 60 years ago. The preservation of this nuclear taboo is crucial; strategists are rightly concerned by technical developments which suggest that nuclear weapons might once again be seen as usable military options.

4.7.2 There was discussion of the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War and the world was alarmingly close to a nuclear confrontation during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet the memories of the effects of the two bombs used against Japan reinforced a sense that use of nuclear weapons should not be threatened in circumstances other than national survival. While the memory of 1945 will fade further as the years pass, there has been a societal trend to value individual human life more highly. Arguably, international opinion makes it unlikely that a State will be able to break the taboo on use of nuclear weapons without major damage to its international standing.

4.7.3 With respect to the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, in 1996 the International Court of Justice delivered an advisory opinion on the issue, which was inconclusive. It found that although in most circumstances the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be illegal due to their indiscriminate and disproportionate effect on civilians and therefore prohibited under international humanitarian law, the court, however was unwilling to reach such a finding in extreme cases of self-defence where the survival of the nation is at stake. Moves towards more usable nuclear weapons, as in the United States, brings into question the legality and indeed morality of using nuclear weapons. The working group has seen two opinions of leading counsel and international law experts, one of which was recently commissioned by Greenpeace from Philippe Sands QC, which argue that the use of the Trident system would breach customary and humanitarian international law.

4.7.4 The White Paper contains repeated assurances, which are unsupported by argument, that the replacement of Trident poses no problems in international law. The working group heard conflicting views on whether a decision to replace Trident was contrary to the UK's obligations under Article VI of the NPT. While the recent opinion from Philippe Sands QC argues that replacing Trident is not in conformity with the UK's obligations under the NPT, the government has always argued that Article VI obliges the UK to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament, not to disarm. But the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion emphasised that the obligation was not merely to negotiate: "…the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result, nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith." To repeat Kofi Annan's forceful statement "All of the NPT nuclear-weapon States are modernising their nuclear arsenals or their delivery systems. They should not imagine that this will be accepted as compatible with the NPT. Everyone will see it for what it is: a euphemism for nuclear re-armament."

4.7.5 The continuation of the special nuclear relationship with the US involves the UK building nuclear weapons of US design and the US also provides specific non-nuclear components of those weapons. This seems to come close to the indirect transfer of nuclear weapons between the US and the UK, which is forbidden by Article I of the NPT. The NWS cannot expect the non-weapon-states party to the NPT to fulfil their commitments, while it is unclear whether the nuclear weapon states have fulfilled theirs.

4.7.6 The UK is one of the five nuclear weapon states defined by the NPT. International law therefore recognises that it may possess nuclear weapons. If it decided not to replace Trident, it would still remain a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. That may imply that if it decided not to replace Trident but the security situation worsened appreciably, the UK could legally resume its nuclear weapon activities. In such a changed security situation, however, it is not possible to predict how much of the NPT would be in force. As for practical feasibility, the UK would continue to operate nuclear powered submarines whether or not Trident was replaced so it would only need to purchase a delivery missile from the US or France or alternatively use aircraft. The UK possesses about 70 tonnes of plutonium at Sellafield, much of which comes from reprocessing fuel from the Magnox reactors in operation since the 1950s. This plutonium is usable in weapons so that even if its current weapon stockpile were dismantled it would have no difficulty in assembling small fission weapons very quickly. Although that plutonium is safeguarded by Euratom, the UK has the right to withdraw it for military use under Article 14 of its 1976 Agreement with Euratom and the IAEA.

4.8 The ethical and environmental arguments

4.8.1 Nobody believes that there can be an ethical basis for the use of nuclear weapons because they are intrinsically indiscriminate, would kill large numbers of civilians and could cause massive damage to the environment for an indefinite period. In addition to the casualties caused instantaneously by the initial blast, there would be radioactive contamination over an indefinite area and for an indefinite period from fission products which would cause large numbers of well-known diseases especially among young children: ranging from leukaemia to thyroid and bone cancer. The argument advanced for retaining nuclear weapons is the belief that their possession would deter others from using theirs. Leaving aside whether it is an ethical argument, it is not persuasive because even those who wish to keep Trident say we should not use it. The argument thus depends upon a bluff that although we would never use nuclear weapons, our enemies would believe that we might use them. Whether the bluff was effective during the Cold War is not now relevant. It is no longer convincing today because the political consensus within the UK is that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be contemplated. Indeed the retention of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom, which is one of the safest countries in the world, could contribute to a spiral of nuclear proliferation which can only render the use of nuclear weapons or nuclear accidents more likely.

4.8.2 The Working Group heard evidence from a distinguished philosopher who specialises in the ethics of warfare. He reported that during the Cold war the existential threat to our society of a military attack by the Soviet Union using nuclear weapons was considered to be so great that the possession of nuclear weapons by the UK as a deterrent was understandable, if not justifiable, in ethical terms. In the absence of such a threat, the UK's possession and threat of use of nuclear weapons are neither understandable nor ethical.

4.8.3 As a party we pride ourselves upon our green policies and our commitment to incorporate the environmental dimension into all our policies. The government White Paper refers to the effects of climate change as a factor in future uncertainty, uncertainty which is supposed to justify keeping Trident. No argument is developed to show how nuclear weapons could possibly contribute to dealing with those effects. What is certain is that the use of nuclear weapons has disastrous consequences for the environment, well beyond the area where they are used and continuing into the indefinite future. The manufacture, stockpiling and eventual decommissioning of such weapons and the nuclear-powered submarines that carry them also pose serious environmental problems and risks.

5 Conclusions

5.1.1 The international context has changed beyond all recognition since the old debates of multilateralism versus unilateralism that divided parties in the 1980s - it is time for the debate to move on. Many of our adversaries of the 1980s are now partners in the EU while our disputes with Russia now centre on gas prices and secure supply, not SS20s. The UK and China have settled the problem of Hong Kong and there are large trade flows between our two countries. Liberal Democrats have already developed a distinctive foreign policy over Iraq and we should use the opportunity presented by the Trident replacement issue to strengthen our political position in the country. We should assume the moral and intellectual leadership in the debate.

5.1.2 We face immense global challenges, including climate change, terrorism by non-state actors and security issues associated with failed states. Britain's continuing possession of nuclear weapons offers no meaningful security guarantees in the face of such threats. Trident or its successor system could not be used against non-state actors or failed states, nor would it deter non-state actors or failed states. Nor did Britain's possession of nuclear weapons in 1982 prevent the invasion of the Falkland Isles. It is extremely difficult to envisage any circumstances in which the Trident system could actually be used. The Working Group was told that the Ministry of Defence has developed no such scenarios.

5.1.3 Britain is now more secure from any direct threat from foreign states than in any previous period of its history, and it is unlikely that direct threats to Britain alone will re-emerge within the foreseeable future. If Trident is a form of insurance against unanticipated threats to national survival, we are paying a very high premium against a highly unlikely risk. Likelier threats to insure against: - of state collapse outside Europe leading to disorder spilling over into other regions, or of local conflicts spreading across frontiers to disrupt friendly and stable states - require other military resources to contain them: infantry battalions, tactical and long-range air transport, logistical support. Maintenance of the nuclear deterrent force, with significant running costs, contributes nothing to meeting these needs. A further squeeze on these military assets, in order to find the resources to renew the deterrent force, would lower even more Britain's overstrained conventional capabilities. In our view funding on conventional capabilities is a more rational use of scarce resources to insure against future threat.

5.1.4 Iran and North Korea seem determined to follow a nuclear option. Both problems

need to be solved by diplomacy: the probable outlines of a solution for each is known. While there is a global problem caused by the apparent breakdown of the non-proliferation regime, neither North Korea or Iran pose a threat to the territory of the United Kingdom. Britain's renewal of Trident or renunciation of Trident is irrelevant as far as these states are concerned.

5.1.5 The Liberal Democrats are committed to disarmament in a multilateral context.

However, the recent moves to proliferation together with the current US administration's hostility to nuclear disarmament suggest that the prospect of multilateral disarmament remains remote. By renouncing its nuclear weapons, the UK would buttress those states which are committed to non-proliferation: it would join Canada, Sweden, Australia and South Africa as states who could have developed nuclear weapons or did develop nuclear weapons but decided that increased security came from preventing further nuclear proliferation and thus renounced their nuclear weapon programmes. In particular, it would remove the hypocritical "Do as I say, not as I do" element in discussing nuclear weapons with non-nuclear-weapon states. Michael McGwire argues that [given a British decision not to replace Trident] "Britain would demonstrate that nuclear weapons are neither essential to political status nor necessary for British national security. It would be in a position to reassert the nuclear taboo and to argue publicly against the further development of nuclear weapons"....Britain would also be "uniquely qualified to 'initiate a process leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons' picking up where the international Canberra Report left off in 1997."

5.1.6 Although the UK has tended to talk about an independent nuclear deterrent, in practice, our nuclear deterrent is essentially tied to the United States. In many ways the UK Trident fleet acts as if it were part of the US Navy: its patrols are coordinated with

US fleet movements as part of the US integrated battle plan for its nuclear forces; the US has provided us the nuclear weapon designs and component parts for our weapons, while the Trident missiles themselves are stored and serviced at King's Bay, Georgia. The US provides the missile fire control system and the targeting software. This arrangement may (or may not) have had advantages during the Cold War but many Britons would now like us to exercise our foreign policy more independently. The UK at present is a permanent supplicant to the US. Not replacing Trident would allow the UK a foreign policy more in keeping with the mood of the country.

5.1.7 Several of the expert witnesses to the working group addressed the justification by the government of replacing Trident in terms of insurance against an uncertain future in these terms: you don't pay the highest premium to insure against the unknown and the unlikely. You insure against likely threats and you commit your best minds and greatest resources to preventing them. In the case of peace and security this means building global institutions and international law, supporting international development and social justice, and fighting "poverty, ignorance and conformity".

5.1.8 One highly eminent witness told us that in his view, the decision on Trident was a test of the relative influence of, on one hand, the democratic process and on the other, powerful industrial and military interests, including "the submariners", of which the outcome was a foregone conclusion because the latter interests would prove too strong and there would not be a serious political debate. The potential profits from a replacement programme are huge and we are aware that industrial interests have been lobbying hard. We think it is nothing less than a failure in the opposition's duty and a failure of democracy if none of the main parties is prepared to put the case, which we believe a powerful one, for non-replacement, especially as many party members and according to polling data a large proportion of our fellow citizens are in favour of that case.

5.1.9 What one can say with certainty about the next 50 years is that they will be unlike the past 50 years. The US is a profoundly religious country the majority of whose citizens do not believe in evolution: is it likely that the world view of the US will remain aligned with that of the secular and rationalist UK for the next 50 years? Already very different approaches to global warming, the International Criminal Court, international law, the death penalty and the treatment of prisoners have become apparent in the last five years between our two countries. Yet the government decision to replace Trident assumes that US-UK relations will remain completely aligned over that time period. Similarly, in Scotland a majority of the population is against the possession of nuclear weapons, but the UK's nuclear fleet is based in Scotland. Is this situation likely to persist over the next 50 years or could Scotland conceivably follow Ireland and become an independent state within the European Union? The answers to these questions pose potentially serious difficulties for the government's decision.

5.1.10 We suspect that the government White Paper reflects a fear of an attack by other parties and the media rather than a considered judgment on the benefits of Trident replacement compared with costs: financial, political, and military. The heart of the case for retaining Trident is based upon fear: fear of the unknown and the unlikely. Only a few years ago the Liberal Democrats were brave enough to stand against the accepted wisdom of the establishment in going to war with Iraq. We were proved right and the public has recognised it. Now it is time to do it again.

Norman Dombey

David Grace

Jo Hayes

December 2006